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Collateral Damage: American Science and the War on Terrorism
Abstract
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States government undertook a rushed effort to
increase security. In addition to new legislation such as the Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the government dramatically ramped up enforcement of laws that have long been on the books, and
revised its policies to deal with new terrorist threats.
While the need for increased security is undeniable, the costs of security measures need to be weighed as well,
in terms of collateral damage they produce to the U.S. science and engineering (S&E) enterprise. That was the
message of a panel discussion held at the June 2004 IEEE-SSIT International Symposium on Technology and
Society (ISTAS'04) in Worcester, MA [1]. We focus here on two main problems: the increasing difficulties
faced by students and scientists from abroad in obtaining visas to visit and study in the United States, and the
barriers that are being erected to communication and collaboration between U.S. investigators and
international scholars.
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In the wake of the terroristattacks of 2001, the UnitedStates government undertooka rushed effort to increasesecurity. In addition to new
legislation such as the Patriot Act
and the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the government dramatically
ramped up enforcement of laws that
have long been on the books, and
revised its policies to deal with new
terrorist threats.
While the need for increased
security is undeniable, the costs of
security measures need to be
weighed as well, in terms of collat-
eral damage they produce to the U.S.
science and engineering (S&E)
enterprise. That was the message of
a panel discussion held at the June
2004 IEEE-SSIT International Sym-
posium on Technology and Society
(ISTAS`04) in Worcester, MA [1].
We focus here on two main prob-
lems: the increasing difficulties
faced by students
and scientists from
abroad in obtaining
visas to visit and
study in the United
States, and the barri-
ers that are being
erected to communi-
cation and collabo-
ration between U.S. investigators
and international scholars.
“Flattening” of the Worlds
of Science and Engineering
The effect of these changes must be
understood in the context of the
long-term changes in the productiv-
ity of U.S. science vis-à-vis that in
the rest of the world, and America’s
increasing reliance on scientists and
engineers from abroad. As World
War II drew to an end, Americans
might have been forgiven for a mis-
taken impression that science began
and ended in the U.S. At that time,
the United States generated by far
the largest fraction of the world’s
S&E literature, and was the sole
proprietor of advanced technologies
with important “dual use” (military
and civilian) applications.
The changing productivity of
U.S. S&E enterprise vis-à-vis the
rest of the world can be seen clearly
in the bi-annual Science and Tech-
nology Indicators, published by the
National Science Board [2]. Figs. 1
and 2 show the numbers of papers
published in the standard science
and engineering literature by U.S.
authors, compared to those by their
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“… the dependence of U.S. science on foreign scien-
tists is such that biodefense research will be inhibited
if we continue down a road of scientific isolationism.
Apart from the obvious barriers that restrictions on
access to scientific information and tools place on
research, restrictions on scientific training for foreign
nationals will delay those countries from developing
expertise crucial to identifying and containing disease
outbreaks — key to any global strategy against bioter-
rorism. What is required is the proliferation of scien-
tific training worldwide, not scientific isolationism.”
Thomas May [1]
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peers in other countries.
In terms of numbers of papers,
the productivity of the U.S. S&E
community has remained essentially
flat for the past decade, whereas that
of Western Europe, Japan, and other
Asian countries has increased sub-
stantially. In 1945, U.S. scientists
and engineers published about 80%
of the world’s S&E literature; they
now account for less than one-third
of the world’s scientific papers. 
A second major trend has been
the increasing reliance of the United
States on professionals and students
from abroad to fill its ranks of engi-
neers and scientists. Since the early
1980s, the number of U.S. white
males earning doctoral degrees each
year in science and engineering has
been declining (Fig. 3). (Tragically,
similar declines are seen in the num-
bers of doctoral degrees earned by
white female and U.S. minorities as
well). Until 2001, these declines
were offset by increases in degrees
earned by students holding tempo-
rary visas. Now, for reasons that we
discuss in the following section,
these numbers are in drastic decline.
In Europe and Asia, by comparison,
the numbers of people earning doc-
toral degrees in S&E have rapidly
increased (Fig. 4) and now each
region surpasses the U.S. in produc-
tion of doctoral-level scientists and
engineers.
This long-term decline in the
United States vis-à-vis other devel-
oped countries in its science and
engineering productivity does not
reflect a decline in absolute terms.
The U.S. still has roughly 30% of
the world’s share in S&E productiv-
ity, far surpassing that of any other
individual nation. The changes
reflect, rather, the huge government
and private-sector investments by
other countries, and concomitant
declines in U.S. investment in sci-
ence and technology vis-à-vis the
rest of the world.
It means, however, that any
monopoly the U.S. might once have
had on science and technology
around the world has evaporated,
and that the U.S. now depends on
scientific ideas and manpower that
originate outside its borders. In high-
energy physics and materials
research, for example, major
research facilities have been estab-
lished in Europe and Asia. This has
caused the focus of research on
some topics to shift to those regions
from the United States. It also means
that European and Asian firms now
have the option of investing in new
research facilities outside the U.S.,
where they will find a ready supply
of highly educated technical person-
nel and vibrant research programs.
Columnist Thomas L. Friedman has
called this process the “flattening” of
the world [3], and it is clearly taking
place in science and technology as
well as in other economic activities.
In the Wake of 9/11
In response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. govern-
ment passed three major new laws in
2002 (The Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act, the Patri-
ot Act and the Homeland Security
Act), and administratively ramped up
Fig. 1. S&E articles, by selected country/region and U.S. share of world total:
1988–2001 (source: [2]).
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the enforcement of existing laws.
This has led to a morass of problems
for the U.S. S&E enterprise.
Two major initiatives, the Visas
Mantis and Visas Condor directives,
deserve special mention. Visas Con-
dor, which started in January 2002,
checks the name of a visa applicant
against U.S. government databases to
identify terrorists. It primarily affects
Muslim men between ages 16 and
45, from 26 predominantly Muslim
countries.
The Visas Mantis system, estab-
lished by the State Department in
1998, is designed to prevent the entry
of persons who might attempt to
export sensitive technology illegally
from the United States. The program
was initially intended to stem the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It was applied to visitors
from countries designated by the
U.S. as State Sponsors of Terrorism,
and to nationals of countries desig-
nated as “sensitive.” Under Visas
Mantis, visa applications of scientists
are sent to Washington for a check
against a “technology alert list”
(TAL) of dual-use technologies.
The TAL initially included muni-
tions, nuclear, and rocket technolo-
gies and other technologies obvious-
ly of use for weapons development.
Its scope has expanded since the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and now
includes: chemical, biotechnology,
and biomedical engineering, remote
sensing, advanced computer tech-
nologies, materials technology,
cryptography, lasers and directed
energy systems, acoustic and sen-
sors technologies, marine technolo-
gy, robotics, ceramics, and high per-
formance metals and alloys. Even
urban planning and architecture are
mentioned in the list.
The result has been a dramatic
increase in the numbers of visa
applications from foreign scientists
that are being sent to Washington for
security clearance – from 1000 in
2000 to 20 000 in 2003. Many visa
applicants will trigger a Visas Man-
tis review even though their work
poses no security threat to the U.S.
Three complications have con-
tributed to the difficulty encountered
by many foreign scientists and stu-
dents in obtaining visas. The first is
simply the high caseload of consular
officers who, in some European and
Asian consulates, must screen as
many as 200 applicants in just a few
hours. The waiting time for inter-
views can in some cases be extended
by many months
Second, the legislation that created
Fig. 3. S&E Doctorates earned by U.S. citizens and noncitizens: 1980-2001
(source: [2]).
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the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) took “visa policy” away from
the State Department but retained the
consular officer corps to make day-to-
day decisions about issuing visas. The
officials who issue visas, who typical-
ly are junior members of the foreign
service, are unable at times to access
computer records maintained at DHS
or obtain quick answers to questions
about visa policy.
Third, and most important, con-
sular officials have few incentives,
and very powerful disincentives, to
hurry the process along. In a change
made by the U.S. Congress after the
1993 attacks on the World Trade
Center, consular officials may be
subject to criminal penalties if they
grant a visa to a person who subse-
quently commits a terrorist act in
the United States. While these sanc-
tions apply only if a consular offi-
cial is found to have acted in willful
disregard of the law, no official
would want to be put in the position
of having to raise such a defense.
Even minor problems with an appli-
cant’s paperwork, or uncertainty on
the part of the official whether an
applicant needs to be screened for
security, can lead to denial or
lengthy delays in processing a visa
application. Anyone who has ever
filled out a government form, or
filed income taxes, knows how easy
it is to make a mistake, and so the
change in law itself means that
many well-deserving scientists and
students will be denied entry.
The wholly predictable result has
been that the number of visas issued
to students and scientists has
declined precipitously in recent
years. Prior to the September 11
attacks, the number of applicants for
student (F1) visas steadily increased,
but an increasing number of these
applicants were rejected as well,
leaving the numbers of student visas
issued each year relatively steady.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks,
the U.S. government dramatically
decreased the number of student (F)
and exchange (J) visas it issued. Oth-
er visa categories decreased as well. 
Students and scholars from the
People’s Republic of China have
found it particularly difficult to
obtain visas. In a 2002 survey by the
American Institute of Physics1 of
291 students who had accepted an
offer of admission by a physics
department of an American universi-
ty, 100 students were denied visas.
Other students, admitted for study to
the United States, have suffered long
delays in being readmitted to the
U.S. after leaving the country briefly
for family reasons. Aside from secu-
rity reviews, a particularly onerous
burden on students from poorer
nations is the so-called 214b require-
ment that students must prove their
intention to return to their country
upon completion of studies. In view
of the fact that fully 80% of Chinese
students remained in the U.S. in the
decades of the 1980s and 1990s, this
has been problematic at best. 
These requirements have created
great hardships to many students.
One of us (Lerch) has personally
intervened in more than 200 visa
cases, most of them concerning sci-
entists or students who were lawful-
ly working or studying in the U.S.,
who left the country for various rea-
sons and were denied re-entry.
Examples include a married Chi-
nese student couple in the U.S. who
returned to China following the
death of his parents in an accident,
and a Russian woman who had
worked for 11 years in the U.S.
Department of Energy’s Ames Lab-
oratory, who went to Germany on
family business and was not allowed
to return [5]. One of our undergrad-
uates recently had trouble re-enter-
ing the country because of security
concerns triggered by her major
(bioengineering and finance), which
shows the lack of specificity of the
Technology Alert List.
In part as a result of difficulties in
obtaining visas, there has been a
major shift in the number and
national background of internation-
al S&E students in the U.S. A recent
(2005) survey by the Council of
Graduate Schools (CGS) reported a
5% decline in the number of inter-
national graduate applications to
U.S. universities between 2004 and
2005 (Table I). This continues a
decline in first-time graduate enroll-
ments every year since 2001. A
Table I
Trends in International Graduate Applications: 2003-2004 and 2004-2005
Application Changes Application Change
2003-2004 2004-2005
US Domestic and Permanent 0% –1%
Resident
International –28% –5%
Country of Origin
China –45% –13%
India –28% –9%
Korea –14% 0%
Middle East +4% +6%
Field of Study
Business –24% –8%
Education –21% –3%
Engineering –36% –7%
Humanities –17% +2%
Life Sciences –24% –1%
Physical Sciences –22% –3%
Social Sciences –20% –4%
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Source: [14] 1 Survey conducted by [4].
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2004 survey by the Association of
American Universities (AAU) [6]
reported that 51 out of 52 AAU
members experienced a decline in
graduate applications, and a majori-
ty of AAU members reported
declines in new international stu-
dent enrollment. Smaller effects
were found at the undergraduate
level, with 46% of AAU respon-
dents reporting a decrease in inter-
national student enrollment while
33% reported an increase.
Scientists from overseas have
commonly faced difficulties in
obtaining visas to attend confer-
ences in the United States. In view
of lengthy processing times of three
months or more, the American
Physical Society currently recom-
mends that individuals from “sensi-
tive” countries such as China submit
their visa applications six months
before a conference date in the U.S.
Visa problems were a major factor
in the decline of Chinese and Russ-
ian participants at the biannual
International Symposium in Lepton
Photon Interactions (LP). At LP-
1999 held at Stanford, 12 of 16
invited Chinese citizens and 7 of 25
invited citizens of the former Soviet
Union attended. At LP-2003 at Fer-
mi Lab (near Chicago, IL) only one
of about 20 invited Chinese and 5 of
20 invited Russians attended.
Almost all of Russians who did
attend traveled with multi-entry visa
or were already in the U.S.
“Sensitive but
Unclassified” Information
Another major impediment to Amer-
ican S&E enterprise has been the rise
of controls on what the government
considers to be “sensitive but unclas-
sified” information. The statutory
basis for such controls derives from
the Export Administration Act and
Arms Control Act. This Act regulates
“deemed exports”(defined as the
release of controlled technology or
technical data that conveys informa-
tion to a foreign entity or individual
in the U.S.). The lists of controlled
technologies are extensive, and dif-
ferent sets of regulations apply to
commercial technology (adminis-
tered by the Commerce Department)
and military technology (adminis-
tered by the State Department). Vio-
lation of export controls can lead to
stiff penalties including fines or
criminal sanctions.
Thus, a professor who gives a talk
about a controlled technology at an
international meeting (or even at a
domestic meeting if overseas visitors
are present), or merely shows an over-
seas visitor around the lab, would
require a deemed export license. A
saving grace, for many university
researchers, is the exemption from
Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) of fundamental research that is
intended to be published in the open
literature. However, the government’s
definition of fundamental research is
narrowing. According to recent inter-
pretations of government policy, a
government-funded project stands to
lose its status as “fundamental
research” if the sponsor stipulates any
restriction on publication or dissemi-
nation of the findings of the research,
or if the investigator agrees to exclude
non-U.S. citizens from meetings with
project sponsors. Losing that status
would require an investigator to apply
for a deemed export license for the
research, which might delay a project
Safety First: A Checklist for Researchers
Officials at the University of California and beyond say there are several key steps researchers 
should take to keep their projects free of deemed-export controls:
• Publish early and often to ensure that your research qualifies as “publicly available.”
• Do not accept restrictions on access to or dissemination of information, including
informal “handshake” agreements with project managers.
• Do not provide citizenship, nationality, or visa status information to project sponsors or
other third parties, or agree to background checks for project participants.
• Do not attend meetings from which foreign nationals are barred.
Source: [13].
As WWII drew to an end, Americans
might have been forgiven for a
mistaken impression that science
began and ended in the U.S.
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for months or longer. This has led the
University of California at Berkeley to
offer guidelines to researchers to keep
their research free of deemed export
controls (See box).
More rigorous enforcement of
deemed export controls is in store
for universities. In March 2004, the
Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Commerce issued a report
entitled, “Deemed Export Controls
May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensi-
tive Technology to Foreign Nation-
als in the U.S.” [7], and took the
position that controls apply to
research equipment that has poten-
tial dual-uses, whether or not it is
being used for fundamental
research. The report calls for a new
policy that requires a deemed export
license for employees or visitors
who were born in countries to which
the export controls apply (China,
Cuba, India, Iran, Israel, Libya,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
Sudan, and Syria), regardless of
their present citizenship. In March
2005, the Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of Industry and
Security, published an advanced
notice of rulemaking in the Federal
Register that would implement
those recommendations [8]. 
The implications for U.S. sci-
ence are troubling. As Robert Hardy
from the Council on Governmental
Relations concluded in his Novem-
ber 2004 assessment [9]:
“[T]he most immediate issue
is the discussion of the “use”
of EAR [Export Administra-
tion Regulations] – controlled
equipment by foreign nation-
als at universities and the fun-
damental research exemp-
tion... Many items routinely
used in university research,
e.g., high-end computers,
oscilloscopes, and fer-
menters, are included in the
controlled list…. Security
would have to be implement-
ed to ensure in such cases that
non-licensed foreign mem-
bers of and visitors to the
campus will not have access
to controlled equipment. This
interpretation eviscerates the
EAR fundamental research
exemption. It will have a
chilling effect on university
research and education as
well as compel discriminato-
ry treatment of foreign
nationals on campus.”
If these regulations come into
effect, the day may soon be at hand
when students in U.S. universities
will have to wear color-coded iden-
tification badges, with students born
in China, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pak-
istan, Russia, Sudan and Syria (even
though they might presently be U.S.
citizens) being denied access to par-
ticular instruction or research
opportunities, depending on the
controls that are in effect for their
countries of birth. One might
assume that plenty of high-end
computers, oscilloscopes, and fer-
menters are found elsewhere in the
world, out of reach of U.S. deemed
export controls. Overly broad
restrictions on access to such equip-
ment by foreign-born scientists in
U.S. labs will only damage the
country’s science without any bene-
fit of improved security.
The effects of controls on “sensi-
tive but unclassified” information
are particularly severe for the nation-
al laboratories. Even in the three
national laboratories that conduct
weapons research, the vast majority
of research is unclassified and in the
public domain. The weapons labs
have had many visitors who have
conducted scientific and engineering
business. All of this has now come to
a halt. What will happen to the
Brookhaven National Laboratory,
for example, which has a billion dol-
lar investment and 10 000 users, half
of whom are foreign?
Restrictions on
Scientific Collaboration
and Publication
A bizarre episode, involving the
ability of scientific journals within
reach of U.S. law to publish articles
from authors in several countries,
has recently concluded. This saga
began shortly after the Sept. 11 ter-
rorist attacks, when the IEEE, after
reviewing U.S. laws regarding trade
embargoes, essentially withdrew all
member services to members in
embargoed countries (including
Cuba, North Korea, Iran, until
recently Sudan and Libya). The
IEEE, unannounced, stopped pub-
lishing papers from authors in these
countries and in 2002 requested a
ruling by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury on the matter. 
A subsequent series of rulings by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) of the Department of the
Treasury created confusion and anxi-
ety among scientific and other schol-
arly societies. In its first ruling (Sept.
2003), OFAC said that journals could
publish papers from authors from
embargoed countries, but could not
"edit" them (or even correct their
English) without a license. A later
ruling (April 2004) allowed limited
editing but forbade "collaborative
interactions" between authors in
embargoed countries and U.S. schol-
ars that result in co-authorship. Need-
less to say, many jointly authored
papers appear every year (more than
200 in 2003 with U.S. and Iranian co-
authors), and the ruling would, obvi-
ously, criminalize many American
U.S. scientists and engineers now
account for less than one-third of
the world’s scientific papers.
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scientists. In December 2004, the
publication issue came to a happy
end. The U.S. Treasury issued a "gen-
eral license" that allows "U.S. per-
sons to freely engage in most ordi-
nary publishing activities with
persons in Cuba, Iran, and Sudan"
(and presumably other countries on
the embargoed list as well). 
The finding by OFAC was a clas-
sic case of bureaucratic overreach-
ing, and constituted one of the
gravest threats to the integrity of
U.S. scientific freedom in decades.
OFAC’s ruling was taken in
response to an inquiry by IEEE.
And whereas IEEE chose to accept
the OFAC adjudication that obliged
publishers to seek government
license before publishing such
material (a form of prior restraint on
publication that is seemingly in ten-
sion with the First Amendment),
many other scientific publishers
ignored the order. 
In the face of pending litigation
(including a complaint filed by Iran-
ian Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi),
OFAC reversed its original ruling in
December 2004, and granted a “gen-
eral license” for publications to edit
and publish manuscripts submitted
by authors from embargoed coun-
tries. However, much damage had
been done to American science in
general and to the IEEE in particular.
Prominent European scientists and
engineers protested the 2003 OFAC
ruling, and more than 5000 members
of the IEEE around the world signed
a petition protesting that “discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality or
country of residence goes against the
principles of an international scien-
tific organization.” In the aftermath
of the Iraq invasion, a number of
European scientists called for boy-
cotts on U.S. publications. Had the
2003 OFAC order been enforced by
the courts, European and Asian jour-
nals would have rushed to replace
U.S. journals, creating immediate
damage to the U.S. science and engi-
neering publishing enterprise. 
However, the issue is not fully
resolved. “The AAUP [American
Association of University Profes-
sors] welcomes the Treasury
Department's recognition that
restricting scholarly exchanges does
not contribute to international secu-
rity,” says Roger Bowen, general
secretary of the organization. “But
we still oppose the notion that the
federal government has any right to
regulate the exchange of informa-
tion between individuals in two
countries, even by granting a 'gener-
al license.' Congress has spoken on
this matter: information and infor-
mation materials are exempt from
trade embargo laws” [10].
Limiting Damage
to U.S. S&E Enterprise
In a powerful statement in 2003,
M.I.T. Vice President Alice P. Gast
[11] described ways in which gov-
ernment controls will damage the
U.S. S&E enterprise:
■ “The control of information
restricts its dissemination
domestically as well as inter-
nationally. This undermines
our system of peer review,
competitive proposal evalua-
tion, and collaboration, and
removes the serendipitous
discoveries arising from casu-
al access... 
■ The restrictions of research
results discourage young peo-
ple from pursuing research in
heavily regulated fields. If the
restrictions and processes to
pursue research become too
onerous, scientists will
migrate to other work… 
■ Controls on information and
international participation in
research damage our relation-
ships with allies…Once [sci-
entists] begin to boycott U.S.
conferences or avoid sabbati-
cals in the U.S. due to the dif-
ficulties they face or in soli-
darity with those who face
them, the nation will be
gravely harmed. 
■ Restrictions on the dissemina-
tion of research results under-
mine the close synergy
between research and educa-
tion that make our system
great and propel our leader-
ship in innovation… 
■ When restrictions are not
carefully considered and
weighed, absurd examples of
government controls create an
atmosphere of distrust or con-
tempt within a community of
researchers….
■ Hindering our ability to
recruit the best and brightest
international students and
scholars harms our productiv-
ity and leadership in science
and technology.”
According to Gast, three major
needs have to be addressed: improv-
ing dialog between government and
universities, ensuring openness in
research while protecting national
security, and developing clear and
effective immigration policies. 
These problems have hardly
escaped the U.S. science and engi-
neering communities, but have been
subject to considerable high-level
discussion (if not much public out-
cry by the universities). Particularly
urgent is the need to improve the
visa process, which presently causes
In the wake of the terrorist attacks
of 2001, the United States
government undertook a rushed
effort to increase security.
unconscionable delays even to well-
qualified applicants with a long
track record. To be sure, the U.S.
government has made efforts to
reduce some of the delays. Accord-
ing to a February 2005 statement by
the Government Accountability
Office, the present delay for receiv-
ing clearance under Visas Mantis
has been brought down to about 15
days, from an average of 67 days in
2003; the government has also
extended clearances to allow scien-
tists to exit and reenter the U.S. for
one year without having to undergo
additional Visas Mantis reviews.
And at least one senator has pro-
posed legislation to exempt students
from the 214b requirement (i.e., the
requirement to prove that they
intend to return to their home coun-
tries after their education); the like-
lihood of passage is remote.
More needs to be done. In a
report released in May 2005, the
Committee on Science, Engineer-
ing, and Public Policy of the Nation-
al Research Council [12] called for
“clear procedures that do not unnec-
essarily hinder the flow” of interna-
tional students. The committee rec-
ommended a variety of changes, for
example, changing visa require-
ments to allow international stu-
dents to attend scientific meetings
abroad without fear of being denied
reentry to the U.S. and extending
the duration of Visas Mantis clear-
ances for international students and
scholars from all countries. It also
recommended that scientists partici-
pate in revising—and we hope nar-
rowing—the Technology Alert list
used by the Visas Martis program.
Finding an appropriate balance
between openness and security will
be a difficult process and one that is
subject to bureaucratic over-reaching
by the government. The United States
has a valid interest in not having its
science used against it in a terrorist
attack. But overly broad restrictions
on scientific communication are, if
anything, even more damaging to the
country. If students, scientists, and
firms wishing to start research labora-
tories cannot find adequate collegial
environments in the United States
they will simply go elsewhere, and
the United States will suffer. 
By its immense investments in
S&E over the years and its histori-
cally open policies for admitting for-
eign students, the U.S. has raised the
bar for science and engineering and
exported both the aspirations for
technical excellence and well-
trained students to institutions
throughout the world. By imposing
unnecessary barriers to students of
those students seeking to enter the
U.S., we stand in danger of cutting
off access to the fruits that we our-
selves have produced. The U.S. has
little to gain by discouraging the
globalization of knowledge, since
that process is already well along. To
return to the quotation by Thomas
May at the beginning of this article,
we need to encourage the prolifera-
tion of scientific training worldwide,
not scientific isolationism. 
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Any monopoly the U.S. might have
once had on science and technology
around the world has evaporated,
and the U.S. now depends on
scientific ideas and manpower that
originate outside its borders.
